ABSTRACT This paper investigates the secure transmission in multi-pair massive multiple-input multiple-output amplify-and-forward (AF) relaying networks under active pilot spoofing attacks. The AF relaying beamforming and the artificial noise generation are designed based on the imperfect estimated channel state information. Exploiting a random matrix theory, we first derive the tractable analytical expressions for the end-to-end signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios (SINRs) at both the intended user and the eavesdropper. Then, we provide the asymptotic results for derived SINRs with respect to the infinite number of relay antennas, unbounded transmit power, and relay power, which show that the SINRs at intended user and eavesdropper are both limited by specific bounds and the effects of relay noise or received additive noise will be eliminated in these extreme power cases. Moreover, power scaling laws are studied to reveal that only the scaled relay power is effective, while source power has no scaling properties for secure transmission in the considered system. To mitigate the severe information leakage, by superimposing a random detection pilot sequence on the training sequence, a simple method based on the minimum description length criterion is provided to detect the presence of the pilot spoofing attacks. The numerical results are provided to confirm the accuracy of our theoretical derivations and illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
Massive multiple input and multiple output (MIMO) has been viewed as a critical technique to overcome the combined effect of the mobile data traffic soaring trend and the favorable radio spectrum scarcity for the forthcoming fifth generation (5G) communication systems [1] , [2] . By invoking a large number of antenna elements, massive MIMO has many advantages including higher spectral efficiency, better link reliability, reduced radiated power consumption and greater simplicity in signal processing [3] , [4] . Meanwhile, cooperative relaying has been widely studied in the past decade as it can largely extend network coverage, improve system capacity and enhance transmission security [5] , [6] .
Combining cooperative relaying and massive MIMO networks can fully utilize the benefits provided by these two technologies, and thus can fulfill the demand of future wireless communication networks [7] . Currently, massive MIMO relaying for multi-pair communications has attracted much attention from different viewpoints [8] , [9] . In [8] , by employing the maximum ratio combining (MRC)/maximal ratio transmission (MRT) and zero-forcing (ZF) processing at the relays, the achievable rates of the multi-pair relaying with large antenna arrays under different power-scaling schemes have been analyzed in details with perfect channel state information (CSI). Moreover, Ngo et al. [9] studied the asymptotic achievable rate and power efficiency of the multi-pair massive MIMO relaying with imperfect CSI. Furthermore, several researchers have extended the previous works to twoway multi-pair massive MIMO relay networks and obtained abundant valuable conclusions [10] , [11] . In addition, [12] and [13] investigated the spectral efficiency and energy efficiency of multi-pair two-way massive MIMO relaying in half-duplex and full-duplex modes over Ricean fading channels, respectively. Existing research findings indicate that this massive MIMO relaying system can achieve significant performance gain providing by the large antenna array [14] .
Privacy and security are becoming increasingly important in upcoming wireless communication systems [15] , [16] . As a complement to traditional key-based cryptographic techniques, physical layer security has been proposed from an information-theoretic perspective, and attracted considerable attention in the last decade since it can guarantee tight security regardless of the computing power of the wiretapping devices [17] , [18] . Fortunately, massive MIMO has the potential application of physical layer security since the large antenna arrays can generate perfect beam pointing to the legitimate user and avoid possible signal leakage [19] . Especially, massive MIMO is immune against passive eavesdropping [19] , [20] . On the other hand, pilot contamination and active pilot attacks have also brought many fateful consequences for secure massive MIMO transmission [21] , [22] . An intelligent eavesdropper can transmit the same pilot sequence during the training phase to contaminate the channel estimation, which is called pilot spoofing attacks [23] . This active attack leads to significant information leakage and enhances the eavesdropper's performance [24] . By comparison with passive attacks, the active attacks can be detected by the minimum description length (MDL) method [25] , energy ratio detector approach [26] , uncoordinated frequency shift scheme [27] and etc. Among them, MDL detection is a simple and excellent scheme as it needs no reverse training and no threshold calculation. In addition, most literatures focus on one-way communications, i.e. downlink or uplink transmission. For the considered massive MIMO relaying system, combination of the two technologies can remarkably enhance secrecy performance by jointly exploiting their potentials. Chen et al. [28] have theoretically analyzed the secrecy performance of amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-andforward (DF) massive MIMO relaying systems. It shows that AF relay can achieve a better security performance with large transmit power. Besides, [29] intensive studied the joint power and time allocation in secure massive MIMO DF relaying system. Moreover, [30] investigates the secure communication in wireless powered massive MIMO relay system where the relay is powered by source's wireless power transfer. However, these aforementioned works merely focused on the single-pair relay systems. To further extend the previous works, Guo et al [31] investigated the physical layer security in multi-pair communications in massive MIMO relay networks by providing closed-form deterministic equivalents of achievable ergodic rates at legitimate user and eavesdropper. Reference [32] addressed the problem of secure transmission in multi-pair massive MIMO relay network over Ricean fading. However, [31] and [32] only considered a passive eavesdropper, and no existing works on the secure transmission in the multi-pair relaying massive MIMO system with active attacks has been reported.
Motivated by the above analysis, we investigate the secrecy performance of multi-pair massive MIMO AF relay networks in presence of active pilot spoofing attacks. To the best of authors' knowledge, no other works have considered the secure multi-pair massive MIMO relay networks with active spoofing attacks. Main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• With the imperfect estimated CSI, a low complexity MRC/MRT beamforming and AN generation at relay is designed. Using random matrix theory, we derive analytical and asymptotic end-to-end SINR equivalents of intended legitimate user and eavesdropper, respectively.
• Based on the achieved SINR expressions, some asymptotic behaviors are analyzed including extremely large number of relay antennas, infinite transmit power and unbounded relay power. Theoretical results reveal that relay noise component or received additive noise component vanishes separately in the extreme power cases and the achievable rates of legitimate user and eavesdropper converge to constant values.
• Power-scaling properties of transmit power and relay power are then presented, which indicate that the relay power has the scaling properties and relay power can largely be cut down inversely proportional to the number of relay antennas to maintain a fixed security level. Nevertheless, the scaling law is not applicable for source power to obtain a constant secrecy rate.
• In order to mitigate significant information leakage, the MDL criterion is used to detect the presence of active spoofing attacks. In our proposed detection scheme, partial power has been allocated to superimpose a random detection sequence on the training sequence at the legitimate receiver, allowing use of data correlation matrix to detect the pilot contamination attack. The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section II, we describe the system model, and also introduce the channel model and uplink channel estimation. Section III provides the secrecy performance analysis of the considered multi-pair massive MIMO relay network. Discussions on asymptotic performance and power scaling laws on transmit power and relay power follow in Section IV. Then, a simple detection method of the pilot spoofing attack is carried out in Section V. Simulation results are presented in Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
Notation: Throughout this paper, boldface lowercase letters and uppercase letters represent vectors and matrices, e.g.
g, G. (·)
T , (·) * and (·) H are the matrix transpose, conjugate and Hermitian transpose, respectively. g (|g|) means the Euclidean norm (absolute value) of a vector g (a scalar g). E {·}, var {·}, diag {·} and rank (·) denote operations of expectation, variance, diagonalization and rank, respectively. A circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random vector x with mean m and covariance matrix A can be represented by 
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The considered system model is described in Fig. 1 , where K single-antenna source users (SU 1, SU 2, · · · , SU K ) transmit data to their corresponding single-antenna terminal users (TU 1, TU 2, · · · , TU K ) in pairs through a relay (R) with M K antennas. Meanwhile, there is an active singleantenna eavesdropper (Eve) concealing in the receiving side, which tries to intercept the transmitting confidential information from the relay. The relay operates in half-duplex timedivision duplex (TDD) mode. Due to the channel reciprocity, the channels can be estimated by uplink pilot training. On the other hand, it needs two time slots to transmit the information. Firstly, source users send K signals simultaneously to relay in the first time slot. In the second time slot, by using the estimated CSI, relay exploits AF protocol to forward the signals. Similar to other works [8] - [13] , we assume there are no direct communication links between the source users and terminal users (eavesdropper) due to heavy shadowing and/or path loss attenuation. For convenience, some most important variables used in this paper are listed in Table 1 .
A. CHANNEL MODEL
For the sake of brevity, G SR ∈ C M ×K and G TR ∈ C M ×K are used to represent the channel matrices between source users (SUs) and relay, and the channel between relay and terminal users (TUs). They are assumed as flat-fading channels and can be precisely represented as
where
are all diagonal matrix with large-scale fading coefficients, H SR ∈ C M ×K and H TR ∈ C M ×K represent the fast fading channel matrix with Similarly, the channel vector between the Eve and relay g ER ∈ C M ×1 can be represented as
where β ER and h ER denote large-scale path loss coefficient and random component with i.i.d CN (0, 1) elements, respectively. Moreover, as the large-scale fading coefficients can keep constant over many coherence intervals, we assume they are known a priori. Also, the small-scale random channel components are assumed invariable within each coherence block.
B. UPLINK CHANNEL ESTIMATION
Practically, relay should estimate the channel matrices for forward processing. Adopting the channel reciprocity in TDD mode, channels between all users and relay can be estimated by uplink training at the relay. At the beginning interval τ of each coherence interval T , all 2K users simultaneously send pilot sequences to relay for uplink training. To avoid pilot contamination, orthogonal pilot sequences should be chosen for uplink training, that is, τ ≥ 2K . Moreover, the pilot sequences are used repeatedly and always publicly known as system design parameters and standards. Hence, an intelligent active eavesdropper can intercept the intended users' pilot signals and imitate the legitimate user to send the same pilot sequence. The received pilot signals at relay can be given by
where p p and p E denote the average pilot power of users and Eve separately,
is the whole channel matrix of the two hops, N R ∈ C M ×τ is the additive Gaussian noise matrix with i.i.
is the pilot sequences matrix. To avoid pilot contamination, orthogonal VOLUME 7, 2019 pilot sequences are exploited, which satisfies T * = I 2K . We assume that Eve tries to eavesdrop the information from kth pair users, that is, Eve will send the same pilot sequence as TU k, i.e. ϕ E = ϕ TR,k .
By projecting Y R onto ϕ * i,j , i = {SR, TR}, j = 1, 2, · · · , K , the processed signals can be given by
r elements. Using the minimum mean-square-error (MMSE) estimation [21] , [33] , relay can estimate the channels aŝ
Moreover, the real channels can be denoted by
whereĜ andG represents estimated channel matrix and estimation error matrix, respectively. According to the properties of MMSE algorithm,Ĝ andG are mutually independent. The column vectors ofĜ andG are characterized
where the parameters η i,j and ε i,j can be given by
Then, we define a new notation that
As vectors g ER and g TR,k are mutually independent and zero mean, we can easily derive that E{g T ERĝ * TR,k } = M η ER . According to (5) and (6), we know that vector g ER andĝ *
TR,i
are mutually independent when i = k, i.e.
Then, we can define another new notation as
Theorem 1: The expectation for the norm-square of the cross product between g ER andĝ * TR,i can be given by
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A. The above notations and equivalents will be used to analyze the SINRs of legitimate users and Eve in next section.
III. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this paper, relay exploits linear MRC/MRT AF beamforming based on the estimated imperfect channel CSI. Also the relay transmits artificial noise (AN) signals to enhance the system's security. Then, we first derive the analytical SINR expressions of legitimate users and Eve. Also, the analytical expression for achievable ergodic secrecy rate is achieved to evaluate the system's secrecy performance.
A. DATA TRANSMISSION
The considered multi-pair relay system takes two time slots for the entire signal transmission. In the first time slot, all SUs simultaneously send signals to relay. Thus, the received signal at the relay is given by
T is the i.i.d data symbols with unit norm, i.e. E |s k | 2 = 1, ∀k = 1, 2, · · · , K . p s is the average transmit power of SUs. n R ∈ C M ×1 denotes the additive Gaussian noise vector with i.i.d CN 0, δ 2 R elements. Utilizing AF protocol and the estimated CSI, the relay forwards its received signal with MRC/MRT scheme. The processed signal vector at the relay can be represented by
where W = αĜ * TRĜ H SR is the MRC/MRT beamforming matrix, and α is the normalization factor which satisfies E x R 2 = 1. In addition, we assume that the relay has no knowledge of Eve's CSI. Therefore, relay can exploit the large antenna array to generate AN signal to degrade Eve's eavesdropping ability. Similar to [22] and [32] , we use the left (M − K ) degrees of freedom ofĜ TR provided by the antenna array. The generated AN signals can be given by
where 
and n E ∼ CN 0, δ 2 E denotes the additive Gaussian noise components at TUs and Eve separately.
B. ACHIEVABLE ERGODIC SECRECY RATE
With the same assumptions as [22] , [32] , and [33] , the target kth TU only know the statistic knowledge of its channel, i.e. E g T TR,k Wg SR,k , whereas the intelligent Eve have the perfect information of its own channel, i.e. g T ER,k Wg SR,k . Therefore, the received signals at kth TU and Eve can be given by
where n E ∼ CN 0, δ 2 E is the additive noise component at Eve. We can see that the first terms of the two formulas are the desired signal component, and the rest parts can be considered as effective additive noise components. It is easily noted that the desired signals and the effective noise components are mutually uncorrelated. Hence, the expectations for the SINRs of kth TU and Eve are given by
where the notations
denote the desired signal variance, multi-user interference, amplified relay noise and AN leakage component at TU k, respectively. Besides,
represent multi-user interference, amplified relay noise and AN component at Eve.
Exploiting the random matrix theory [34] , we can derive the deterministic equivalents of the terms in (21) and (22) .
Theorem 2: By employing the MRC/MRT beamforming and AN generation with estimated CSI by MMSE algorithm, the asymptotic limits (where M → ∞) of the terms in γ k and γ E,k are given by
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By inserting these notations and expressions into (21) and (22), we can derive the deterministic equivalents of γ k and γ E,k , respectively.
Proof: Please see Appendix B. Based on the above analysis, we define the ergodic secrecy rate as
where R k = 1 2 log 2 (1 + λ k ) and R E,k = 1 2 log 2 1 + λ E,k denote the achievable ergodic rate at kth TU and Eve with term 1 2 due to the half duplex mode.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS
Next we investigate asymptotic performance of the secure relaying system. To get some simple and insightful results, we will consider some extreme cases based on the obtained SINR analytical expressions.
A. LARGE NUMBER OF RELAY ANTENNAS
From the previous analysis, we note that the SINRs of legitimate users and Eve both monotonously increase with M . To get some simple yet insightful results, we resort to obtain the asymptotic bounds of SINRs where M → ∞. Consequently, the limits for the SINRs can be written as (34) and (35) , which are shown on the top of this page.
It is noted that the SINRs are both unbounded with increasing M where p E > 0. Conversely, if Eve keep passive during the training phase, that is, p E = 0, the limit SINR ofγ E,k will converge to a constant while the increase of intended user's SINR will be unbounded, which implies that the massive MIMO relaying system has excellent capability against passive eavesdropping. With an active attack, we observe that both SINRs increase with same scale M from (34) and (35) . Moreover, (35) reveals thatγ E,k is a monotonically increasing function in η ER . Meanwhile, η ER increases with Eve's pilot power p E . Hence, it is necessary to investigate the effect of p E . Then, we investigate the condition to achieve a positive secrecy rate, that is, γ k > γ E,k . Specifically, limit valuesγ k andγ E,k can be used to get the required condition that Eve's pilot power should not exceed some fixed values. As the closed-form analytical solutions are complicated, we get the results by one-dimensional search in simulation results (Section VII). This suggests that for a larger Eve's pilot power, the secrecy rate decreases and even get zero secrecy rate. Hence, detection of the active spoofing attack is crucial for secure transmission in massive MIMO relaying system. We will present a detection scheme in next section to compensate for this negative effect. Furthermore, the corresponding achievable limit secrecy rate is given by (36) shown on the top of this page, which illustrates that the SINR difference between legitimate user and Eve will be a constant when the number of relay antennas goes to infinity. It means that the multi-pair massive MIMO relay system will get an upper bound of secrecy rate by equipping infinite number of relay antennas.
B. LARGE SOURCE TRANSMIT POWER
We consider another extreme case that the SU power p s is infinite large while the relay power is fixed. By omitting the zero expectation terms, the SINRs can be rewritten as
where the new term
Based on these results, we note that both SINRs converge to fixed values with a fixed p R and unbounded p s . Hence, the achievable secrecy rate is bounded by
In addition, it can be found that the amplified relay noise components disappear in (37) and (38) . It can be explained by the fact that the SNR at the relay is infinite in this extreme case so that noise power is negligible. Hence, the MRC/MRT beamforming can be designed unaffected by relay noise.
C. LARGE RELAY POWER
With an unbounded relay power and a fixed source transmit power, we can rewrite the SINRs as
where p A P R denote the power ratio between AN and data signals.
Evidently, both SINRs are constants with fixed transmit power p s and limitless relay power p R , p A → ∞, so we can also derive an upper bound of secrecy rate in this limiting case. Furthermore, we can observe that the additive noise components at TUs and Eve vanish in the two expressions, which also can be interpreted that the noise components are negligible compared to received intended signal power. Another important but not obvious feature is that the powers p s , p R and p A simultaneously have impacts on γ k and γ E,k , which reveals that there will be an optimal power allocation to maximize the achievable secrecy rate. We will turn to obtain the optimal power allocation schemes in the following section.
D. POWER-SCALING ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS
Due to the huge array gain, massive MIMO system can significantly cut down the transmission power. Next, we investigate the power-scaling properties of the secure transmission in massive MIMO relaying system in details. 
Meanwhile, we have
Proof: Please see Appendix C.
From the above results, we can observe that the achievable SINRs of TUs and Eve both converge to zero as M → ∞ if a > 1, which implies that the average transmit power has been significantly weaken. Contrarily, if a < 1, they become unbounded, which means that transmit power can be cut down more to get the same performance. It is interesting to observe that only when a = 1, γ k and γ E,k can get a fixed positive value. Nevertheless, the limit values are same, which means that the power scale law is not suitable for source power p s .
Theorem 4: Exploiting MRC/MRT beamforming with imperfect estimated CSI and a scaled relay power, i.e.
Proof: Using the similar procedure as in Theorem 3, we can directly get the results in Theorem 4.
Hence, we obtain a similar conclusion that b = 1 makes the intended TU and Eve achieving a fixed ergodic information rate, while an unbounded information rate or zero rate will be obtained when 0 < b < 1 or b > 1. In addition, the ergodic secrecy rate will converge to fixed values where 0 < b ≤ 1 as (48) shown on the top of the next page. Further, it can be deduced that the system can obtain a positive ergodic secrecy rate at the condition that β ER ∈ 0,
We note that the power scale laws in considered massive MIMO relaying system with active spoofing attacks is totally different with passive attacks case [32] . It is interpreted that with a scaled transmit power and M → ∞, the ergodic information rates of the TUs and Eve are determined by
the communication link between source users and relay. This conclusion can be easily deduced from (34) and (35) . Similarly, with a scaled relay power, links between relay and TUs almost dominate the achievable information rates level. Therefore, the receiving and eavesdropping abilities determine the information rates which can be proved by (46) and (47). The power-scaling laws are very beneficial for system design. In addition, according to the previous discussions, we note that the achievable rates of the target TU and Eve both are affected by source transmit power, AN power and relay power. Thus, the power allocation can be exploited to maximize the achievable secrecy rate or energy efficiency in this considered system. Researchers have proposed some power control schemes including optimization approach and game theory approach [33] , [35] , [36] . Due to the space limitation, power control isn't considered in this paper.
V. ACTIVE PILOT SPOOFING ATTACK DETECTION
For a TDD massive MIMO system, pilot spoofing attack not only degrades legitimate user's signal reception quality but also results in a significant information leakage to Eve which can be seen from (21) and (22) . In addition, we can implement the pilot spoofing attack detection at training phase to mitigate the information leakage. This detection problem essentially can be considered as a hypothesis testing problem, namely, make the judgment based on the knowledge of pilot sequences and received pilot signals. Similarly to [23] and [25] , we use the minimum description length (MDL) criterion to operate the detection in this section. Assuming the kth pair links transmit confidential information, to detect the presence of active eavesdropper, only TU k sends pilot sequence in this detection phase. To operate the detection, we allocate a fraction φ of the training power p p to add another random detection pilot sequence ϕ r (zeromean, i.i.d., normalized norm,
Moreover, other users keep silent in the detection phase. Hence, the received signal at the relay during the detection phase is given by
where matrix N R ∈ C M ×τ is additive noise component with i.i.d CN 0, δ 2 r elements . If Eve is passive, the pilot spoofing power is zero, i.e. p E = 0.
To begin with the detection, we first present two hypotheses with H 0 denoting no active attack and H 1 denoting an active attack present.
Then, we define the correlation matrix of the received pilot signals as
and the correlation matrix of intended signals as
Accordingly, we further have
. It is clearly known that rank R S,0 = 1. Since TU k and Eve always have different fading channel, i.e. g TR,k = g ER , we can get that rank R S,1 = 2 if φ > 0. Hence, we can operate the binary hypothesis testing by exploiting MDL algorithm for estimation the signal correlation matrix rank d (signal subspace dimension d = rank R S,i ). We discuss the MDL estimation method next.
Firstly, we make the eigendecomposition of matrix R Y ,i and order the eigenvalues by
Based on these results, we can present the MDL estimator of d following the criterion aŝ
where the objective function is given by
Now the hypotheses can be formulated as
From (56), the signal subspace dimension d can be determined by the MDL method which needs no threshold calculation. Ifd = 1, we declare that no spoofing attack exists, while ifd > 1, we can decide that there is a spoofing attack. Moreover, we acknowledge that the detection probability P d can be given by
Meanwhile, the miss probability is expressed as P d = 1 d = 2 which has been precisely analyzed in [37] and [38] . Due to the space restrictions, we neglect the details in this paper. 
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section provides elaborate numerical results to quantitatively study the secure performance of the considered multi-pair massive MIMO relaying networks. Without loss of generality, Monte-Carlo experiments are operated for this following typical scenario: a single cell with a radius of 500 m is considered with a massive MIMO aided AF relay located in the center, as shown in Fig. 2 . K = 4 pairs served users are uniformly distributed at random within two symmetric sector regions, each spans π 2. Assuming one single-antenna active Eve conceals in the receiving sector side which can transmit a spoofing pilot sequence to contaminate the channel estimation. The distances between users (Eve) and the central relay are restricted to be larger than 100m. As for simulation parameters, the large-scale path-loss is modeled as
where d and d r are transmission distance and minimum reference distance, v is path-loss exponent [38] . We consider that d r = 100m and v = 3. Meanwhile, we assume that the relay, TUs and Eve have the same noise power level, that is, δ 2 R = δ 2 r = δ 2 k = δ 2 E = 10 −3 mW. For uplink channel estimation, the pilot signal energy is set at p p = 1mW, τ = 10. In order to maintain results consistency and data comparability, locations of the users and Eve are as the same in Fig. 2 .
Note that the derived SINR expressions are the foundation of all subsequent analysis in the paper, which are first verified by numerical results in Fig. 3 . With additional power setting at p s = p R = p A = 1mW and p E = 0.1mW, all numerical results are achieved by operating Monte-Carlo simulations over 5000 independent channel realizations, shown in Fig. 3 . The small circles in Fig. 3 represent the obtained corresponding numerical SINRs by simulations. Apparently, it is noted that the analytical SINRs expressions can accurately match the experimental results especially for large M . Therefore, we can utilize these deterministic equivalents to evaluate system's performance in the rest of section. Besides, Fig. 3 illustrates that both TUs and Eve benefit from the increasing of relay antennas. Consequently, pilot spoofing attack will lead to a significant information leakage. These properties indicate VOLUME 7, 2019 that it is hence more significative and practical to investigate the secure performance of the multi-pair relaying networks under active pilot attack.
Then, we can present the asymptotic behavior of secrecy rates and SINRs. The achievable secrecy rates of TUs v.s. the number of relay antennas M are depicted in Fig. 4 . With the same parameters as Fig. 3 , the used AF beamforming is designed based on the imperfect estimated CSI. As expected, the secrecy rates of TUs are monotonically increasing in M and converge to some fixed values as M → +∞ (dashed transverse lines, obtained by results in (36) ). It can be easily explained by the fact that both SINRs of TUs and Eve are monotonically increasing functions of M confirmed by (21) and (22) . While the impact of M on TUs is greater than that of Eve in the employed parameters which can be evaluated by derivative operation. Hence, the ergodic secrecy rate increases with M . Next, we investigate the asymptotic behavior of SINRs under extremely large transmit power and relay power. In this subsection, we only simulate and compare the SINRs of TUs and Eve as shown in Fig. 5 where the values of all dashed transverse lines denote the upper bound limits with p s = +∞ or p R = +∞ obtained by (37) , (38) , (41) and (42). When analyzing the effects of infinite p s or p R , the other power level keeps constant which are set as p R = p A = 1mW or p s = 1mW. As shown in Fig. 5 , it can be observed that both SINRs of TUs and Eve are monotonically increasing at transmit power p s or relay power p R . Also, the SINRs approach to the upper bounds closely with large p s or p R . Besides, we note that SINRs of TUs can be enlarged by increasing number of relay antennas, whereas Eve get a slightly increment with a large number of antennas. These conclusions coincide with the discussions in Section IV. Fig. 8 . With the layout of TUs and Eve in Fig. 3 , we can compute the large-scale fading coefficients as β TR,1 = 0. 1411, β TR,2 = 0. 0164, β TR,3 = 0. 0249, β TR,4 = 0. 0489 and β ER = 0. 064. From the previous description in Section II, we note that the estimated CSI quality is mainly determined by large-scale fading and pilot power by TUs and Eve. Thus, Eve need to transmit more pilot power to eavesdrop the TU with a larger large-scale fading coefficient in general. This can be verified in Fig. 8 that Eve need the largest power to make the secrecy rate zero at TU1. To operate the detection, we set that p p = 10dB, δ 2 R = 0 dB, τ = 10 and φ= 0. 5. The curves of detection probability P d versus Eve's pilot power p E are achieved by averaging the obtained results from 5000 random independent Monte-Carlo experiments, depicted in Fig. 9 . It is obvious that the detection performance improves with increasing TU's large-scale fading coefficient and Eve's pilot power. Moreover, the detection probabilities are all over 0.98 at p E = 5dB. Hence, the proposed detection scheme can be able to detect active attacks at weak power levels. Although a simple case with fixed parameters were adopted in Fig. 9 , we can make an extension that all TUs have the autonomy to adjust their own transmit power allocation and pilot sequence. This is outside the scope of this paper which can be left for future works.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The secure transmission of multi-pair massive MIMO AF relaying system in presence of pilot spoofing attack has been studied in this paper. Based on the estimated channel state information, AF relay exploits MRC/MRT beamforming and AN generation for signal forwarding. Using random matrix theory, we first respectively deduce analytical equivalents of the end-to-end SINRs at the target user and Eve. Then, some asymptotic results are obtained at infinite number of relay antennas, unbounded transmit power or relay power conditions, which illustrate that the achievable ergodic information rates of legitimate users and Eve all converge to some fixed values in these extreme cases. Besides, we consider the power scaling laws for transmit and relay powers, which reveal that only relay power has the power scaling properties to keep a constant secrecy rate in the considered massive MIMO relaying system. Moreover, MDL criterion has been utilized to detect the pilot spoofing attacks to mitigate significant information leakage. Numerical results are presented to demonstrate the performance of the secure massive MIMO AF relaying system. Moreover, in order to further improve the system's spectral efficiency and energy efficiency, power control and non-orthogonal pilots can be exploited. We can focus on these aspects in future.
APPENDIX

A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We first recall that Eve only spoof the intended user's pilots signals, so Eve's channel has different correlation values with the estimated channels, which can be seen from (10) Let us focus on the case at i = k. Since g ER andĝ TR,i are mutually independent and zero mean, based on the property tr {XY} = tr {YX}, we can get the following results as
Then, considering the situation when i = k, we can rewrite the expression as 
Utilizing similar derivations as above, we can get
In addition, we know that 
Thus, we complete the proof.
B. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We can consider the deterministic equivalents of the terms separately of the SINRs expressions. Utilizing the similar derivations as [31] , we can get the deterministic equivalents of α 2 . Now, we specially choose to investigate the term 
